Current status

The Cliqz project has been shut down, unfortunately. However, their information will be kept live on this site as a homage to the pioneering work Cliqz did for browser tracking protections.

Detail Description
Mechanism Anti-Tracking
Originally deployed in 1.30.0
Latest update deployed in 1.32.1
Latest update includes All cross-origin referrers stripped to origin.
User controls Site-specific and global controls for:
  • Anti-tracking activation
  • Blocking ads
  • Cookie pop-up blocking (consent requests)
  • Anti-phishing
  • Automatic HTTPS connection upgrade

Cliqz Anti-Tracking default settings

Classification of “known trackers”

Cliqz uses an algorithmic classification model for identifying trackers with cross-site tracking capabilities.

This model is run both locally (in the user’s browser) and globally (derived from a global database, periodically updated with data from local contexts).

To understand this better, read this research paper:

WhoTracks .Me: Shedding light on the opaque world of online tracking

You can also browse the service to learn about the status of the global tracker database Cliqz uses.

Third-party cookies

Known trackers have third-party cookie access blocked. There is a heuristical model in place to determine exceptions to this rule. The model includes (source):

  • User interaction with the 3rd party widget. When an element is clicked, Cliqz looks for tracker domain access within the embedded element and temporarily whitelists cookie access for the domain.
  • Redirects. When a domain redirects to a classified domain, the classified domain is whitelisted for temporary cookie access. This is to preserve things like login flows that handle state with cookies.
  • OAuth detection. OAuth flows can be identified fairly easily, and classified domains are whitelisted for temporary access to cookies necessary to keep the flow running.

Cookies that are set on classified domains without first-party interaction (i.e. as third-party cookies) have a maximum expiration set to 1 hour.

First-party cookies

How first-party cookies expire is determined by a) whether the domain the cookies are set on is a classified domain, and b) how frequently the classified domain is visited in first-party context.

If the domain is not a classified domain, first-party cookies have a maximum expiration of 7 days (if set without the HttpOnly flag) or 30 days (if set with the HttpOnly flag).

Example: A JavaScript SDK (e.g. an analytics) tool writes a cookie in the user’s browser, assigning them with an anonymous, randomly generated client identifier. The purpose of this identifier is to assign multiple visits by the same browser to the same “user”. If the user visits the site within 7 days of the previous visit, the cookie will persist in the browser, and the analytics platform will be able to identify the browser as one that has previously visited the site. If the visits happen more than 7 days apart, the user will always be a “new user” to the analytics platform.

If the domain is a classified domain, then infrequent visits to the domain impose a maximum expiration of 7 days to the first-party cookie. If the domain is visited frequently, the maximum expiration is set to 30 days (with the HttpOnly limitation same as above).

Other third-party storage

No current restrictions.

Other first-party storage

No current restrictions.


Cliqz strips all cross-origin referrers to origin only.

Example: The user clicks on a link from to The referer HTTP header and the document.referrer JavaScript object will show as the referrer. All non-navigational HTTP requests will truncate the referrer in a similar fashion.

CNAME cloaking

No protections against CNAME cloaking.


Cliqz automatically purges potential user identifiers from the URL, headers, and POST data of third-party requests.

The model tokenizes all key-value pairs found, and then evaluates the values against a set of rules to determine if it’s safe (should not be removed) or unsafe (should be removed).

This evaluation is done locally first, and then the values are compared against a global safe set (derived from data collected from global Cliqz usage). If the value is flagged as unsafe and does not have a match in the global set, it is purged from the request.

Example: If the browser sends a request to a third-party resource using something like ?userId=abcd-1234-efgh-5678 in the request URL, it’s possible that this parameter will be stripped from the outgoing request so that the service receiving the request will not be able to access the data.

This article has an excellent overview of how this process works (beginning with chapter titled Unsafe Data Removal).