Every technique on this page also has legitimate uses, which is why browsers can’t simply switch them off. When a browser closes one route, trackers tend to move to the next, so the protections in the comparison table have grown roughly in the order of this page.

Third-party cookies

The oldest technique: a tracker embedded on many sites sets a cookie with an identifier, and gets it back on every site that loads it. See Cross-site tracking for how it works.

Ad tech companies also share identifiers with each other through cookie syncingCookie matching / syncing Data management platforms (DMP) and demand-side platforms (DSP) can exchange user information in their own data stores, mapping each platform’s own list of users to other lists by utilizing shared keys in third-party storage.: one tracker redirects to another with its identifier in the URL, so both can map their IDs for the same browser.

How browsers respond: Safari blocks third-party cookies, Firefox and Brave partition them, Edge blocks them for known trackers, and Chrome allows them. See Cookies in third-party context.

When third-party cookies don’t work, a tracker can carry its identifier in the URL instead. A platform where the user is signed in adds an identifier to outgoing links:

https://shop.example/product?fbclid=IwAR3x…

A script from the platform on the destination site reads the parameter and stores it in a first-party cookie on that site, where third-party cookie protections don’t apply. Ad click IDs such as gclid and msclkid work the same way.

How browsers respond:

  • Brave removes known tracking parameters from URLs.
  • Safari limits cookies set by script on a page reached this way from a known tracker to 24 hours.
  • Other browsers don’t restrict it by default.

See Cookies in first-party context and Other.

Bounce tracking

Instead of linking straight to the destination, a link sends the user through a tracker’s domain first, often too fast to notice:

news.example → click → tracker.example/r?to=shop.example → shop.example

During the redirect, tracker.example is the top-level site, so it can read and write its own first-party cookies and see where the user came from and where they’re going.

How browsers respond:

  • Safari detects domains used for bounce tracking, including ones that add a delay to look like a normal page, and deletes their data.
  • Firefox deletes the storage of known trackers that the user hasn’t interacted with for 45 days.
  • Brave skips known bounce trackers and goes straight to the destination (“debouncing”).

Fingerprinting

A fingerprint combines details the browser exposes, such as screen size, fonts, time zone, graphics hardware and how it draws to a <canvas>, into an identifier. It needs no storage, so cookie protections don’t affect it, and the user can’t delete it.

How browsers respond:

  • Brave randomizes the values of commonly fingerprinted APIs per site and per session.
  • Firefox and Edge block requests to known fingerprinting scripts, and Firefox also limits what the browser reveals about the device.
  • Chromium-based browsers freeze some details of the User-Agent string.

See Fingerprinting.

CNAME and IP cloaking

A site can point one of its own subdomains at a vendor’s server, through a DNS CNAME record or simply an A record with the vendor’s IP address:

metrics.shop.example.  CNAME  shop-example.vendor.example.

Requests to metrics.shop.example look first-party: they get first-party cookies, including ones set with Set-Cookie, and they aren’t matched by lists of third-party trackers.

The same setup is used for legitimate reasons, such as running your own server-side taggingServer-side tagging Sending analytics and marketing data first to a server the site controls, usually on its own subdomain, which then forwards it to vendors. It lets the site set cookies from its own server and control what vendors receive. When the server … on your own domain. The difference is who controls the server and the data.

How browsers respond:

  • Brave looks up the CNAME record of each request and blocks it if it points to a known tracker.
  • Safari limits cookies set by such subdomains to 7 days, both for CNAME records pointing to another site and for subdomains on an IP address that doesn’t match the site’s.

See CNAME cloaking.

Identity resolution

Identity resolution services build an identity graph that links identifiers such as hashed email addresses, phone numbers, IP addresses and device details, so they can recognize the same person on different sites and devices without a shared cookie. A site sends the identifiers it has, for example the hashed email of a signed-in user, to the service and gets back a shared ID.

How browsers respond: Safari 27 blocks cross-site requests to known identity resolution services. See Blocking of known trackers.

Referrer

The Referer header and document.referrer tell a site which page the user came from. A full URL can carry identifiers, search terms or other personal details in its path or query string.

How browsers respond: all browsers send only the origin of the referring page to other sites by default. Some don’t let sites loosen this. See Referrer.